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ABSTRACT:  This Article challenges the notion that there is no role 
for privacy in the domestic violence context.  Privacy is a complicated 
concept that has both positive and negative aspects, and this Article 
examines the value that more privacy could provide for domestic 
violence victims.  While privacy was historically used as a shield for 
batterers, more privacy for domestic violence victims could protect 
their personhood, ensuring that they are treated with dignity and 
respect.  In addition, current mandatory criminal justice policies have 
become so intrusive in many victims’ lives that limitations are needed 
to prevent the threat of state abuse.  These protections are particularly 
important for poor victims and victims of color who are more 
vulnerable to such abuses. In many cases, a domestic violence victim’s 
choice not to pursue the arrest and prosecution of her batterer should 
be respected by state authorities.  In addition, no victim should be 
required to cooperate as a witness against her batterer.   
Do Not Copy or Distribute Without the Author’s Permission 
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It’s Complicated:  Privacy and Domestic 
Violence 
 
“I swear I won't call no copper 
If I'm beat up by my papa 






 It was not that long ago that the formal legal system did very 
little to protect women from domestic violence because state actors 
believed that violence between intimates was a private matter that 
should be handled within the family.
2
  Activists in the women’s 
liberation and early battered women’s movements, however, strongly 
critiqued the use of privacy to shield batterers from legal intervention 
and made significant strides in changing the public’s perception of 
the state’s role in this area.
3
  Now, whenever there is a news story 
highlighting yet another brutal injury or murder of a woman by an 
intimate partner, there is a public outcry demanding to know why no 
one did anything to prevent it
4
; state intervention is now viewed as a 
necessary tool in combating violence in the home. 
                                                 
1 BILLIE HOLIDAY, AIN’T NOBODY’S BUSINESS IF I DO (CBS 1975). 
2 Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”:  Wife Beating As a Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L .J. 2117, 2170-71 (1996).  But see ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY:  THE 
MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 
THE PRESENT 18-23, 92 (2004) (discussing how judges in the late nineteenth century viewed 
marital rape as a legitimate ground for divorce and how informal community pressure, 
church courts, and criminal law were used to limit family violence in Puritan communities);  
KRISTEN S. RAMBO, TRIVIAL COMPLAINTS 23, 35 (2009) (discussing how during the late 
nineteenth century victims sometimes did get help through informal measures implemented 
by family members, church congregations, and even the Ku Klux Klan).   
3 Kimberly D. Bailey, Lost in Translation:  Domestic Violence, “The Personal is Political”, 
and the Criminal Justice System, 100 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1255, 1259-1265 (2010);  
Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 748-56 (2007);  G. Kristian 
Miccio, A House Divided:  Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization 
of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 258-59 (2005). 
4 See, e.g., Erika Slife, When Cop Causes Family Violence;  Many Victims May Have 
Nowhere to Turn, Experts Say, CHI. TRIBUNE, September 3, 2008, at W1 (using the Drew 
Peterson case to highlight the need to provide more support for domestic violence victims 
who are the spouses of police officers).   See also  Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 
116 YALE L. J. 2, 44-45 (2006) (“In the oral culture of a prosecutor’s office, a misdemeanor 
[domestic violence] defendant has the potential to be an O. J. Simpson.  In other words, 
every case is to be treated as a potential prelude to murder.  Rookie prosecutors are warned 
that their DV misdemeanors are the cases that could get their names in the newspaper for 
failure to prevent something more serious.  Thus in DV cases prosecutors make decisions in 
the shadow of public oversight and have an enhanced incentive to use every means available 
Do Not Copy or Distribute Without the Author’s Permission 
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 Still, although the general public tends to believe that 
domestic violence is a public issue that should be handled by the 
criminal justice system, many victims view the violence that they 
experience as a personal or private matter.  According to National 
Crime Victim Surveys, twenty-two percent of victims reported that 
they did not seek help from the police after experiencing violence for 
precisely this reason.
5
  One of the reasons that feminists argued so 
forcefully in favor of the conception of domestic violence and other 
crimes against women as public matters was because there were so 
many victims who wanted assistance from the police, but were 
nevertheless ignored.
6
  It appears, however, that there is actually a 
significant number
7
 of women who actually do want to be ignored—
at least by the criminal justice system. 
 In Part II of this Article, I describe in detail how the activism 
of feminists in the women’s liberation and early battered women’s 
movements changed the cultural and legal view of domestic violence.  
I also describe the creation of mandatory arrest and prosecution 
policies, which require the intervention of the criminal justice system 
regardless of the wishes of the victim. 
 In Part III, I make a normative argument in favor of allowing 
most domestic violence victims to choose not to engage with the 
criminal justice system.
8
  To support my view that victims’ choices 
should matter, I re-examine the concept of privacy.
9
  Because privacy 
                                                                                                                 
to protect victims.”).  Yet the fact that the general public now takes domestic violence more 
seriously does not mean that there are not victims who still experience skepticism from the 
criminal justice system.  See infra Part _____;  see also Bailey, supra note ____, at 1277-80. 
5 SHANNON CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvus.pdf 
[hereinafter INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE].  
6 Gruber, supra note _____ , at 757-58;  Miccio, supra note _____, at 279.  
7
 Some might question whether twenty-two percent is really a significant number of victims.  
Given that 4.3 million women claimed to have experienced physical violence at the hands of 
an intimate partner in the twelve months prior to taking the Center for Disease Control’s 
2010 National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, this number cannot be taken 
lightly.  MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE 
PARTNER & SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY:  2010 SUMMARY REPORT 43 (2011), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_Executive_Summary-a.pdf. 
8 For other critics of mandatory policies see Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law 
Reform in Domestic Violence Law:  A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801 (2001); 
Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism:  An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory 
Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2009); Gruber, supra note 
____, at 741; Linda G. Mills, Commentary:  Killing Her Softly:  Intimate Abuse & the 
Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV L. REV. 550 (1999). 
9 It is worth noting why I choose to ground my discussion of victims’ choices in the concept 
of “privacy” instead of “autonomy” or “liberty.”  See ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS:  
PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 4 (1988) (discussing how many scholars believe that 
some misuse the term “privacy” when they really mean “liberty”). First, when the Supreme 
Court discusses the right to make personal choices about family life with limited interference 
by the state, such as in the context of contraceptive use and abortion, they have grounded 
Do Not Copy or Distribute Without the Author’s Permission 
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was historically used to shield batterers from state intervention, its 
benefits for domestic violence victims have been ignored.  The 
concept of privacy is already strongly valued in both American 
culture and jurisprudence, and it is the foundation for significant 
women’s rights such as contraception use and abortion.
10
  Instead of 
accepting the notion that the concept of privacy is always detrimental 
to domestic violence victims, I draw upon this tradition to describe 
the aspects of privacy that could actually be valuable.  With respect 
to domestic violence victims and the criminal justice system, two 
forms of privacy are at stake.  The first is the type of “restricted 
access” privacy defined by Anita Allen as a “degree of inaccessibility 
of persons, of their mental states, or of information about them to the 
sense and surveillance devices of others.”
11
 The second is “decisional 
privacy,” or the freedom to make choices in family matters with 
limited state intervention.
12
  Both types of privacy are essential to 
preserve victims’ personhood and to ensure that they are treated with 
dignity and respect.  More privacy also limits the threat of state 
abuse.  Poor victims and victims of color are particularly at risk for 
privacy violations. 
 Part IV argues that when one acknowledges the 
interrelatedness of the public and private spheres, it is not 
theoretically inconsistent to provide affirmative protection to victims 
while preserving some of their privacy.  With this is mind, Part V 
urges policymakers, feminist activists, and victims’ advocates to 
consider the possibility that the criminal justice system can be more 
effective without imposing mandatory policies.  Furthermore, a 
potential line-drawing problem in determining when to intervene in a 
violent relationship is not an excuse to ignore victims’ privacy.  
Finally, a grassroots approach must work in conjunction with a 
criminal justice solution in order to help a greater number of 
victims.
13
   
                                                                                                                 
these discussions in the concept of privacy.   See infra Part ____.  But see also Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (grounding its discussion in the concept of liberty); Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (same).  For this reason, I have decided to use this 
same language in order to remain consistent with this jurisprudence.  A full discussion 
regarding whether these types of choices should be grounded in privacy, liberty, or the equal 
protection clause is beyond the scope of this Article.  I do not view decisional privacy, 
however, as involving atomistic choice or decision-making that is purely based on one’s 
individual needs; the reality is that domestic violence victims make their decisions in the 
context of their intimate relationships with their partners and children. 
10 See infra Part _____. 
11 ALLEN, supra note ____ at 3. 
12
 ANITA, supra note ____ at 32. 
13 It should be noted that a significant amount of domestic violence is addressed through the 
civil legal system through the civil protection order.  Jane Aiken & Katherine Goldwasser, 
The Perils of Empowerment, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 139, 146 (2010).  A discussion 
Do Not Copy or Distribute Without the Author’s Permission 
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II. HOW THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 
CHANGED THE NATIONAL CONVERSATION ABOUT 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
 
Physically chastising one’s wife was once legal in the United 
States.
14
  Even though “wife beating” was eventually defined as a 
crime on the books
15
, it would be decades before state actors took 
serious steps to enforce these laws.
16
  Influenced by liberal theorists 
such as John Locke, state actors believed that domestic violence was 
a matter that should be handled within the privacy of the home.
17
  
Locke is associated with the view that there are two separate spheres 
of life:  the public sphere, which is appropriate for government 
intervention, and the private sphere, in which government 
intervention is inappropriate.
18
  Family life was included in the 
                                                                                                                 
regarding privacy in the civil context is beyond the scope of this Article, but for a discussion 
about the merits of protective orders that prohibit abuse but allow partners to have contact 
and to maintain their relationship see Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection 
Orders for Domestic Violence:  Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the 
Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487 (2008).  For a critique of the routine practice of 
denying domestic violence victims’ motions to vacate a civil protection order see Tamara L. 
Kuennen, ‘No Drop’ Civil Protection Orders:  Exploring the Bounds of Judicial Intervention 
in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39 (2007). 
14 Anglo-American common law provided that a husband could subject his wife to corporal 
punishment or “chastisement” with the only limitation being that he could not inflict 
permanent injury.  Siegel, supra note _____ at 2170-71.  But see PLECK, supra note _____ at 
21 (noting that spousal abuse was illegal as early as the seventeenth century in American 
Puritan communities). 
15 Wife beating was illegal in all states by 1920.  Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose:  
Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 
1857 (1996).  Some feminist scholars have argued that the repudiation of the right of 
chastisement was partially about controlling African-American men because some of the 
seminal cases in this area involved African-American defendants.  RAMBO, supra note ____, 
at 29.  In one Alabama Supreme Court case, the victim and the perpetrator were emancipated 
slaves.  Id. The Alabama Supreme Court stated that “the wife is not to be considered as the 
husband’s slave.”  Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146 (1871).  Reva Siegel has questioned 
whether the court meant “to ensure that the woman is not treated like a ‘slave,’ or to prevent 
her recently emancipated husband from asserting the ‘privileges’ of a master”.  Siegel, supra 
note _____, at 2135.  In another case, the Supreme Court of Mississippi repudiated the right 
of chastisement and noted “a belief among the humbler class of our colored population of a 
fancied right in the husband to chastise his wife.”  Harris v. State, 14 So. 266, 266 (Miss. 
1884).  Kristen Rambo notes that the reference of race and class in this case coupled with the 
implication that Harris did not know his place “suggest that [the judges] intentions were not 
solely focused on protecting women from abuse.”  RAMBO, supra note ____, at 29.   
16 Siegel, supra note ____, at 2170-71.  See also PLECK, supra note ____ at 23 (noting that 
although wife beating was illegal in some American Puritan communities in the seventeenth 
century, courts placed more of a priority on family preservation than on the physical 
protection of victims). 
17 Bailey, supra note ____, at 1259-60. 
18 Bailey, supra note ____, at 1259-60. 




  What was most significant about this view of 
privacy was that “Locke’s formulation of citizen-as-head-of-
household” led judges “to recognize the right of privacy only for the 
heads of households [, which] made this particular privilege a 
specifically patriarchal one.”
20
  This view was reflected in the actions 
of social workers, the police, and prosecutors.  For much of the 
twentieth century, “judges and social workers urged couples to 
reconcile, providing informal or formal counseling designed to 
preserve the relationship whenever possible.  Battered wives were 
discouraged from filing criminal charges against their husbands [and] 
urged to accept responsibility for their role in provoking the 
violence.”
21
  Similarly, on those occasions when the police were 
called to the home, the typical response was to give the husband an 
opportunity to cool off, and the police would then leave it up to the 
couple to resolve their differences.
22
  Even if the wife wanted 
stronger intervention measures, such as arrest and prosecution, the 
police and prosecutors routinely ignored these cries for help.
23
 
 Feminist scholars and activists involved in the women’s 
liberation movement in the late 1960’s and 1970’s vehemently 
challenged this theoretical dichotomy between public and private 
life.
24
    First, they highlighted the fact that it has never been the case 
that the state had no role in family life.
25
  Indeed, determining what 
constitutes a family and what rights and privileges a family possesses 
has always been the role of the state.
26
  Thus, the state selectively 
chose when to intervene, and by ignoring the plight of women in the 
home, affirmatively maintained their subordination.
27
  In other 
                                                 
19
 Bailey, supra note ____, at 1259-60. 
20 RAMBO, supra note ____, at  22.  Rambo notes, however, that the lack of legal formal 
measures to deal with domestic violence led to the use of more informal measures.  Id. at 23.  
“A variety of groups and individuals—ranging from victims’ family members to church 
congregations to feminists to vigilante groups, and even the Ku Klux Klan—all took 
deliberate measures to punish batterers and to protect victims of domestic violence.”  Id.  
These measures ranged from expelling batterers from church congregations to public 
floggings.  Id. at 35. 
21 Siegel, supra note ____, at 2170. 
22 Id. at 2170-71. 
23 Id. 
24 Bailey, supra note ____ at 1260. 
25 See Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 28 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 835, 842-44 (1985) ( “The state is responsible for the background rules that affect 
people’s domestic behaviors.  Because the state is deeply implicated in the formation and 
functioning of families, it is nonsense to talk about whether the state does or does not 
intervene in the family.”) 
26 Id.;  see also Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows:  Criminal Law, Family Law, and the 
Legal Construction of Family Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1255 (2009) (arguing that criminal 
law has always regulated family life). 
27 See Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change:  Law, Language, and 
Family Violence, 43 VANDERBILT L REV. 1665, 71-72 (1990).  Melissa Murray argues that 
Do Not Copy or Distribute Without the Author’s Permission 
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words, it was complicit in the violence that these women were 
experiencing.
28
  Furthermore, by treating domestic violence as a 
personal matter, the state advocated the notion that the phenomenon 
was merely the result of personal squabbling between husband and 
wife.
29
  If each woman were to look inside herself, so it was 
commonly thought, perhaps she could figure out how she was 
contributing to her situation. 
 Feminists involved in the women’s liberation movement 
convincingly made the case, however, that so-called “personal” 
issues such as domestic violence were actually political issues.
30
  
Women were not victims of violence because they were lousy 
homemakers or because they mouthed off too much to their 
husbands.  Instead, they were victims because of the political 
subordination of women as a class in society.  In her influential 
essay, “The Personal is Political,” Carol Hanisch argued that 
“[w]omen are messed over, not messed up!  We need to change the 
objective conditions, not adjust to them.”
31
  Within the context of 
these consciousness-raising groups
32
, women began to realize that 
violence in the home was a prevalent political problem and that 
political solutions would be necessary to overcome it.
33
   
 The battered women’s movement grew out of this political 
consciousness.
34
  Similar to the women’s liberation movement, the 
battered women’s movement was initially a grassroots one.
35
  
Shelters were created, often by women who themselves were 
                                                                                                                 
while the general feminist narrative is that the state’s intervention into family life has not 
included the use of criminal law, the reality is that criminal law has always been used to 
regulate the family.  Murray, supra note ____ at 1264.  The criminalization of incest and 
prostitution are a couple of examples of how the state uses criminal law to maintain a 
specific normative understanding of marriage.  Id. at 1267-70.  Murray further argues that 
the lack of criminal justice intervention in family violence also was to maintain this 
understanding of marriage.  Id. at 1270.  (“By refusing to characterize spousal violence as 
assault and unwanted conjugal sex as rape, criminal law underscored that marriage was a 
status relationship with attendant obligations and prerogatives…It was a space where 
husbands had a right to ‘correct’ wives and where conjugal sex was expected and 
welcomed.”). 
28 See Minow, supra note ____, at 71-72 (“ When clerks in a local court harass a woman 
who applies for a restraining order against the violence in her home, they are part of the 
violence.”).   
29 Siegel, supra note ____ at 2170-71. 
30 Bailey, supra note ____ at 1263-64. 
31 Carol Hanisch, The Personal is Political, NOTES FROM THE SECOND YEAR:  WOMEN’S 
LIBERATION 76 (1970). 
32 Consciousness-raising groups were small gatherings of women where participants 
discussed their personal everyday experiences.  CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST 
THEORY OF THE STATE 84-85 (1989). 
33 Bailey, supra note _____ at 1263-64. 
34 Miccio, supra note ____ at 258. 
35 Id. at 258-59. 
Do Not Copy or Distribute Without the Author’s Permission 
 10 
survivors of abuse, to provide material and emotional support for 
domestic violence victims.
36
  These residents were not viewed as 
“clients,” and they had active voices in determining how the shelters 
should be run.
37
  In addition, on those occasions when a resident 
decided not to end her relationship with the partner who had battered 
her, those wishes were respected.
38
 
 Activists in the battered women’s movement saw the benefit 
of maintaining a movement that was grassroots and non-hierarchical.  
Specifically, many were skeptical of engaging with the state that they 
believed was an active force in maintaining the oppressive patriarchal 
norms that they were trying to transform.
39
  Yet as already discussed, 
the reality was that domestic violence victims sometimes needed the 
aid of the legal system, even though they often had negative 
experiences when they sought its aid.  For this reason, activists 
recognized that something needed to be done about the fact that the 
police, prosecutors, and judges consistently ignored victims; they 
grudgingly engaged with the state in order to remedy this problem.
40
  
These activists were instrumental in providing easy access to civil 
protection orders, which gave victims legal recourse when batterers 
continued to harass and assault them.
41
  They also filed equal 
protection lawsuits in jurisdictions where police had repeatedly failed 
to protect women.
42
   
 Furthermore, some of these activists later advocated for the 
creation of mandatory or preferential arrest policies.
43
  Under 
mandatory arrest policies, the police are strongly encouraged or 
required to make an arrest if there is probable cause to believe there 
has been a misdemeanor domestic violence violation.
 44
   Many 
jurisdictions also became more aggressive in prosecuting domestic 
violence cases by instituting no-drop policies, which require or 
encourage prosecutors to go forward with these cases regardless of 
the victim’s wishes.
45
  It was believed that by removing some official 
discretion, domestic violence cases would be prosecuted at the same 
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 286, 302. 
39 Gruber, supra note ____ at 758. 
40 Miccio, supra note ____ at 274-82. 
41 Emily J. Sack, Battering Women and the State:  The Struggle for the Future of Domestic 
Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1667 (2004) (“By the mid-1990’s, every state had 
enacted a civil protection order statute, including provisions for obtaining an emergency ex-
parte order.”). 
42 Gruber, supra note ____ at 756;  Mills, supra note ____, at  558-59;  Siegel, supra note 
____ at 2171. 
43 Bailey, supra note _____ at 1270. 
44 Sack, supra note _____ at 1669-70.   
45 Hanna, supra note ______ at 1859-60. 
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rate as other assault cases, resulting in formal gender equality.
46
  
Advocates of these policies also hoped that they would deter future 
violence and that they would prevent batterers from intimidating 
victims into eschewing criminal remedies.
47
  They also believed that 
these policies had expressive value and that they showed that the 
criminal justice system was finally taking domestic violence 
seriously.
48
  Jurisdictions were at first very slow in implementing 
these statutes,
49
 but the confluence of “war on crime” political 
rhetoric, as well as the publicity from the O. J. Simpson case in the 
1990’s, created political momentum for the widespread institution of 
tougher criminal justice policies.
50
 
Now all fifty states allow a warrantless arrest when a police 
officer has probable cause to believe that there has been a violation of 
a domestic abuse statute.
51
  Furthermore, many jurisdictions have 
implemented mandatory or preferential arrest and no-drop 
prosecution statutes.
52
  Feminist activists, therefore, were quite 
successful in changing the national conversation about domestic 
violence.  Now, both members of society and policymakers agree that 
the criminal justice system is an appropriate tool in combating 
domestic violence and that it is a necessary one in order to increase 
victim safety. 
 
III.  PRIVACY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS 
 
 Although mandatory arrest and prosecution policies were 
drafted to ensure that the criminal justice system is responsive to 
victims’ cries for help, the reality is that many victims do not report 
their abuse to the authorities.
53
  In addition, when violence does come 
to the attention of the criminal justice system, it is often the case that 
victims become highly resistant to the state’s intervention.
54
 It is 
                                                 
46 Gruber, supra note ____ at 758.   
47Bailey, supra note _____ at 1270-71.    
48 Id. at 1271. 
49 Miccio, supra note ____ at 278-79. 
50 Gruber, supra note ____ at 793. 
51 Hanna, supra note ____ at 1859.  Prior to 1984, most police officers could not arrest a 
suspect without a warrant unless the misdemeanor was committed in the officer’s presence.  
Officers could arrest a suspect without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe that a 
felony had been committed.  Id. 
52 Sack, supra note ___ at 1859-60. 
53 DONALD G. DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN:  PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 218 (1995);  Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:  
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1991). 
54
 EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
RESPONSE 182 (2003); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 
747, 751 (2005). 
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estimated that as many as sixty to eighty percent of domestic 
violence victims either recant or refuse to testify against their 
batterers.
55
  The reasons for this resistance are as complex and varied 
as the victims themselves and include lack of material resources, 
poor interactions with state actors, fear of the batterer, desire to 
maintain the relationship, desire to keep their children in a two-parent 
home, and love for the batterer.
56
   
 Indeed, although feminists worked very hard to change the 
public perception that domestic violence is a private issue, a 
significant number of victims do not engage with the state precisely 
because they still view the violence that they experience at the hands 
of their intimate partners as private.  According to National Crime 
Surveys of Victimization, approximately twenty-two percent of those 
victims who did not seek criminal justice assistance cited privacy as 
the reason.
57
  Given the fact that privacy is highly valued in 
American culture and jurisprudence, it should not be surprising that 
some domestic violence victims might also value their privacy.  For 
this reason, we must challenge the notion that privacy has no value 
for these women.  The truth is that privacy is complicated.  While it 
was historically used to shield batterers from state intervention, some 
degree of privacy for domestic violence victims is crucial if we value 
their personhood and seek to limit the risk of state abuse. 
 
A. Privacy and the Supreme Court. 
 
 Scholars have noted the paradox that privacy has presented 
for women.
58
  On the one hand, feminists and activists worked very 
hard to convince members of society  and the state that privacy in the 
home is a dangerous thing for women because of the inaction it 
engendered regarding domestic violence matters,
59
 Yet privacy is 
also the foundation of important women’s rights such as 
contraception use and abortion.
60
   
                                                 
55 EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
RESPONSE 182 (2003); Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 
747, 751 (2005). 
56 Elaine Chiu, Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1253 
(2001); Donna Coker, Piercing Webs of Power:  Identity, Resistance, and Hope in Latcrit 
Theory ANDPRAXIS:  Shifting Power for Battered Women:  Law, Material Resources, and 
Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1048-49 (2000). 
57 INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, supra note _____. 
58 See, e.g., RAMBO, supra note ____, at 4; JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW:  HOW THE 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 5-6 (2009). 
59 See supra Part ____. 
60 RAMBO, supra note _____, at 4 (2009) (“The concept of state noninterference in the 
private realm that was so critical to the success of the abortion rights movement has also 
been used to protect batterers within the same private realm.  That these two movements 
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 Obviously, not all individual decisions implicate the 
Constitution, but in the early part of the twentieth century the 
Supreme Court established that there is a private realm of family life 
protected from state interference that is rooted in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court interpreted 
the liberty interest enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment as 
including a right to marry, to establish a home, and to raise 
children.
61
  Relying on Meyer, the Court then determined in Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters that it is a violation of parents’ Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interest to enact a statute that requires them to 
send their children to public school: “The child is not the mere 
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny 
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare 
him for additional obligations.”
62
  Furthermore, although the Court 
later stated in Prince v. Massachusetts that the family is not beyond 
state regulation, it again reiterated that “the custody, care and nurture 
of the child reside first in the parents. . . . And it is in recognition of 
this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family 
life which the state cannot enter.”
63
 
 In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court asserted that the 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights “create zones of privacy”
64
 and that 
                                                                                                                 
emerged almost contemporaneously highlights an important legal paradox, as courts and 
activists have had to reconcile these contrasting effects upon women’s rights of the use of 
the concept of privacy.”); SUK, supra note ____, at 6 ( “The version of feminist critique 
according to which home privacy is coterminous with violence is being successfully woven 
into our legal system.  Nevertheless, even after the assimilation of this critique, privacy 
remains a value that is difficult to give up in our constitutional framework and in many 
people’s intuitions about the home.” ). 
61 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
62 Id. at 535.  Alice Ristroph and Melissa Murray argue that Meyer and Pierce are animated 
by a concern about governmental tyranny.   Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, 
Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L. J. 1236, 1263-1270 (2010).  They assert that the 
Court saw the potential for limited family diversity to provide a pluralism that serves as a 
check on the totalitarian and homogenizing impulses of the state, which was evidenced by 
statutes fueled by anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic sentiments.  Id.  This diversity is limited 
in the sense that the protection seemed to be limited to those families that fit the marital 
family norm.  Id. at 1267.  I do not negate Ristroph and Murray’s view nor do I mean to 
suggest that family privacy was the only or chief concern of the Court in Meyer and Pierce.  
Instead, I reference these cases to make the point that the Court established that a type of 
family privacy does exist under the Constitution. 
63 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).   
64 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 514 (1965).  Specifically, 
 
The right of association contained in the penumbra 
of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.  
The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the 
quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace 
without the consent of the owner is another facet of 
that privacy.  The Fourth Amendment explicitly 
affirms the ‘right of the people to be secure in their 
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the marriage relationship lies “within the zone of privacy created by 
several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”
65
  As a result, a state 
statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives by married persons 
was deemed unconstitutional.
66
  The Court later clarified, however, 
that the right of privacy belongs to the individual and not to the 
marital couple as one entity: 
 
Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a 
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two 
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional 
makeup.  If the right of privacy means anything it is the right 
of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to 




In acknowledging the significance of such a decision in an 
individual’s life, the Court cited Justice Brandeis’ dissent in 
Olmstead v. United States:  “’The makers of our Constitution 
undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness . 
. . . They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let 
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued 
by civilized man’”
68
 In Roe v. Wade, the Court expounded on this 
connection between the pursuit of individual happiness and well-
being and the right to privacy when it extended this right “to 
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.”
69
  In justifying its decision the Court explained: 
 
                                                                                                                 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.’  The Fifth 
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables 
the Citizen to create a zone of privacy which the 
government may not force him to surrender to his 
detriment.  The Ninth Amendment provides:  ‘The 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people.’”  Id. 514-15. 
 
65 Id. at 515-16. 
66 Id. 
67 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that a statute denying unmarried 
people access to contraceptives is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
68 Id. at 454 n.10 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) 
69 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (suggesting that this right of privacy is “founded 
in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon the state”).   
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The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant 
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent . . . . 
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman 
a distressful life and future . . . . Mental and physical health 
may be taxed by child care.  There is also the distress, for all 
concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is 
the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, 




Again, the Court highlighted the connection between family planning 
and individual emotional, psychological, and economic well-being.
71
  
Similarly, in Lawrence v. Texas the Court reaffirmed that “the heart 
of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”
72
  For 
                                                 
70 Id. at 153. 
71
 The Court in Roe made it clear, however, that a woman’s right to an abortion is 
not completely unfettered.  It deemed state regulation of abortions appropriate for 
the purposes of protecting the health of the mother and protecting the potentiality 
of human life of the viable fetus.  Id. at 164-65.  In opinions subsequent to Roe, the 
Supreme Court has increasingly shown its support of state regulations that limit the 
ability of women to obtain abortions when the purported purpose is to provide 
these protections.  See generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2006) 
(upholding a federal statute banning intact dilation and evacuation procedures, also 
known as partial-birth abortions);  Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding a state abortion statute containing 
informed consent provisions).  One fair reading of these cases is that they are 
eroding away the privacy right of women guaranteed by Roe.  See Carhart, 550 
U.S. at 191 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In candor, the [Partial-Birth Abortion Ban] 
Act, and the Court’s defense of it, cannot be understood as anything other than an 
effort to chip away at a right declared again and again by this Court—and with 
increasing comprehension of its centrality to women’s lives”).  These cases also 
highlight, however, the complications that arise once we recognize rights on the 
part of each individual in a family unit.  In other words, one could view the 
abortion debate as a disagreement regarding whose rights should trump whose:  
should a woman’s right to privacy trump the potential right to bodily integrity of 
the fetus or the other way around?  A thorough discussion about how to resolve the 
potential conflicting interests among individuals within a family from a 
constitutional standpoint is beyond the scope of this article, but this issue is 
certainly a complicated byproduct of the Court’s determination that the right to 
family privacy belongs to the individual.  See Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing 
Family Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L. J. 557, 598-99 (2006) (“[N]orms of privacy might 
fundamentally collide with those of equality insofar as the rhetoric of privacy-
based non-intervention leave the less powerful vulnerable within the private 
sphere.”);  Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV 1247, 1257 (1999) (“I am concerned the ideology of privacy may 
obscure and condone injustice to children, as it obscured and condoned injustice to 
women”). 
72 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. 
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this reason, it concluded that the right of liberty includes the right of 
same-sex individuals to engage in private sexual conduct without 
state intervention
73
 and that this right “should counsel against 
attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the 
[personal] relationship or to set its boundaries.”
74
 The opinion, 
therefore, connects one’s self-identity with the creation of personal 
relationships. 
 In summary, the line of Supreme Court cases discussed above 
establishes several important aspects of privacy in the personal and 
family relationship context that could be quite valuable for domestic 
violence victims.  First, they emphasize a right of privacy that is a 
right to be free from interference from the state.  Second, this right to 
be let alone is essential in order for people to make certain personal 
decisions.  Third, a certain level of privacy is necessary in order to 
pursue happiness, to find personal fulfillment, to engage in self-
identification, and to maintain emotional, psychological, and 
economic well-being.  Fourth, because of the strong connection 
between family life and the pursuit of these goals, the need to be let 
alone to make decisions regarding some family matters is particularly 
acute.  In other words, decisions related to the family and personal 
relationships can have long-lasting effects on one’s identity and 
fate.
75
  Finally, the right to be let alone to make personal family 
decisions belongs to the individual, not to the family unit or to the 
patriarchal head of the household.  
  
B. What is at Stake for Domestic Violence Victims? 
 
1. The Value of the Domestic Violence Victim’s 
Personhood. 
 
One of the goals of privacy doctrine is to protect one’s 
personhood, or one’s ability to engage in self-definition
76
 and “to 
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
                                                 
73 Id. at 578. 
74 Id. at 567. 
75
 See Roberts, supra note ____ at 1465 (“The concept of decisional privacy seeks 
to protect intimate or personal affairs that are fundamental to an individual’s 
identity and moral personhood from unjustified government intrusion.”);  Jed 
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989) (“Anti-
abortion law, anti-miscegenation laws, and compulsory education law all involve 
the forcing of lives into well-defined and highly confined institutional layers…[The 
right to privacy] is the fundamental freedom not to have one’s life too totally 
determined by a progressively more normalizing state.”). 
76
 Roberts, supra note ____ at 1468;  Rubenfeld, supra note _____ at 752-54 . 
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and of the mystery of human life.”
77
    When domestic violence 
victims cannot have a say in how the abuse in their homes is handled, 
the state sends the message that they are not worthy of respect as 
individuals who are capable of making rational decisions about their 
family lives.  Domestic violence victims are not given this respect 
because of prevalent negative stereotypes that paint them as 
psychologically damaged.  The work of Lenore Walker has been 
heavily influential in the evolution of the image of the domestic 
violence victim.
78
 Particularly well known is her concept of “learned 
helplessness.”
79
  After finding that they cannot control or stop the 
violence they experience, Walker asserted that domestic violence 
victims cease to actively resist their aggressors and instead become 
passive and fatalistic.
80
  Although Walker (herself a feminist) 
cautioned against over generalizing about women’s responses to 
violence,
81
 the unfortunate byproduct of her work has been that 





  If the victim happens to be poor, her poverty adds to this 
conclusion.
84
  Domestic violence victims are also viewed as 
emotionally damaged individuals
85
 who cannot make decisions for 
themselves or for their families,
86
 and therefore they are terrible 
mothers.
87
  Furthermore, if a woman opts to stay in a relationship, it 
                                                 
77
 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. 
78 Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman?  When She Fights 
Back, 20 YALE  J. L. & FEMINISM 75, 82 (2008). 
79 Id. at 82. 
80Id.  at 83. 
81 Mahoney, supra note ______, at 40. 
82 Goodmark, supra note ____, at 83;  Lisa A. Harrison, Myths and Stereotypes of Actors 
Involved in Domestic Violence:  Implications for Domestic Violence Culpability 
Attributions, 4 AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 129, 130 (1998);  Mahoney, supra note 
____, at 38. 
83 PAMELA J. JENKINS & BARBARA PARMER DAVIDSON, STOPPING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  HOW A 
COMMUNITY CAN PREVENT SPOUSAL ABUSE  61 (2001); Goodmark, supra note _____, at 77.  
See also Kate Cavanagh, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence, 2 
QUALITATIVE SOCIAL WORK 229, 232 (2003) (“Conceptions of abused women as passive 
participants in their own intimate relationships are reflected in these assumptions.  However, 
while such conceptions have been refuted for many years, their explanatory power continues 
to exert significant influence in practice”). 
84 See infra Part _____.  But see supra Part ______ (discussing how poor women of color 
often are viewed as the instigators or perpetrators of violence instead of the victims of 
violence). 
85 Harrison, supra note _____, at 130. 
86 Mahoney, supra note _____, at 38-39. 
87 ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 154 (2000) (“Hard as 
it is for society to imagine that a woman who is battered is “reasonable,” it is even more 
difficult to imagine that a women [sic] who is battered could be a good mother.”). 
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is believed to be because of learned helplessness rather than because 
of other rational reasons.
88
   
 The reality is that there are complex and varied reasons why a 
victim may opt to stay in a relationship or avoid a criminal justice 
solution.
89
 Evidence suggests that rather than being passive and 
emotionally damaged, many victims are quite rational, and often 
exercise agency even under constrained circumstances.
90
  Even 
though many may choose not to end their relationships with their 
batterers, they still try to end the violence.  Qualitative research 
suggests that many victims eventually try to engage their partners in 
a dialogue about their abuse in order to confront the violence.
91
  
During this process, women are very much in tune with their 
partners’ moods in order to gauge the best time to get their partners 
to “hear” them.
92
  Victims evaluate their partners’ “use of alcohol, 
tone of voice, repertoire of gestures and mannerisms.”
93
 Domestic 
violence victims are also often quite calculated in their attempts to 
cajole their partners and to defuse potentially violent moods.
94
  When 
victims find that these strategies do not work, they often employ 
more challenging responses such as “verbal confrontation; physical 
confrontation
95
; leaving the relationship
96
; ejecting him from the 
house; and telling others about the violence.”
97
   
The lack of choice that victims have in the resolution of the 
violence in their lives, therefore, is problematic because it is based on 
                                                 
88 Mahoney, supra note ____, at 38 (“Significantly, this description explains her continued 
presence in the relationship, her failure to separate:  her emotional paralysis and inability to 
think clearly are the reasons she cannot think clearly about escape.”). 
89 See infra  note ___. 
90
 Cavanagh, supra note ____ at 229, 232. 
91
 Cavanagh, supra note ____ at 238. 
92
 Cavanagh, supra note ____ at 238.. 
93
 Cavanagh, supra note ____ at 238. 
94
 Cavanagh, supra note ____ at 238.  Examples of such cajoling might include making 
coffee or tea to keep one’s partner in a good mood, acting affectionate and cuddling with 
one’s partner even when the victim did not actually feel such affection, and agreeing with 
one’s partner all of the time in order to keep the peace.  Cavanagh, supra note ____ at 238. 
95
 Victims often either hit their partner first in the hopes of preventing an assault or they hit 
back after an assault to defend themselves.  Cavanagh, supra note ____ at 240.  These 
physical confrontations tend to have mixed results.  Sometimes it temporarily stops the 
violence; other times it antagonizes one’s partner further.  Cavanagh, supra note ____ at 
240. 
96 Some victims find that temporarily leaving the relationship can sometimes reduce the 
violence for a period of time.  Cavanagh, supra note ____  at 241.  Many women end up 
returning to the relationship for a variety of reasons including their feelings for their partner, 
a desire to make the relationship work, the desires of their children, and their partner’s 
promises to change.  Cavanagh, supra note ____ at 241.  Often these reasons have a 
cumulative effect on women, which can create a significant amount of pressure.  Cavanagh, 
supra note ____ at 241. 
97
 Cavanagh, supra note ____ at 239. 
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the false premise that most, if not all, of them are incapable of 
making rational decisions.  While this paternalistic premise is 
partially the result of the well-intentioned advocacy of Lenore 
Walker and other proponents of battered women’s syndrome, it is 
also likely a part of the historical denial of respect and dignity to 
women.
98
  In addition, the fact that the poor and women of color are 
disproportionately affected by mandatory criminal justice domestic 
violence policies
99
 emphasizes how the intersectionality of race and 
class with gender can have devastating effects on one’s access to 
privacy.
100
  It is important that current criminal justice policies not be 
a continuation of this systematic and historical disrespect.  
Furthermore, criminal justice policies should not be just another form 
of subordination and disrespect that replaces that of one’s intimate 
partner.
101
   
 
 2. The Anti-Totalitarian Value of Privacy. 
 
 According to Jed Rubenfeld, the goal of privacy doctrine is to 
protect individuals against the “totalitarian” abuse of state power.
102
  
It may seem extreme to label the state as abusive in the domestic 
violence context because the current mandatory criminal justice 
policies seem to suggest that the legal system is finally taking 
women’s right to be free from violence seriously and that they are 
making them safer.
103
  Even if one accepts that these policies were 
created with the best of intentions, though, the state’s motives are 
irrelevant.  According to Rubenfeld, the right of privacy depends on 
the “productive or affirmative consequences” of a law.
104
  In other 
words, what is important is the extent to which the laws “occupy and 
preoccupy”
105
 an individual’s life.  When these laws “operate 
positively to take over and direct the totality of our lives,”
106
 privacy 
                                                 
98
 See Siegel, supra note ____ at 2122 (“Until the late nineteenth century, Anglo-American 
common law structured marriage to give a husband superiority over his wife in most aspects 
of the relationship. By law, a husband acquired rights to his wife's person, the value of her 
paid and unpaid labor, and most property she brought into the marriage.”). 
99 See infra Part _____. 
100 See Roberts, supra note ____ at 1470 (“Poor women of color are especially vulnerable to 
government control over their decisions”). 
101 See Mills, supra note _____ at 557 (arguing that mandatory policies have some of the 
emotionally abusive elements of a violent intimate relationship). 
102Rubenfeld, supra note _____ at 784;  see also Roberts, supra note _____ at 1468. 
103 But see Mills, supra note _____ at 557 (arguing that mandatory policies have some of the 
emotionally abusive elements of a violent intimate relationship). 
104 Rubenfeld, supra note ____ at 784. 
105 Rubenfeld, supra note _____ at 784. 
106 Rubenfeld, supra note ___ at 787. 




  As will be discussed in more detail 
below, current criminal justice policies seriously affect the emotional, 
psychological, and economic well-being of many domestic violence 
victims, particularly those who are poor or of color; this fact signals a 
threat that their lives are “too totally determined by a progressively 
more normalizing state.”
108
   
 
a. Mandatory Policies and State-Imposed De Facto Divorce 
 
 I will discuss some of the serious negative consequences that 
can result from mandatory policies below, but one of the more 
troubling aspects of current criminal justice policies is a practice 
documented by Jeannie Suk, the “state-imposed de facto divorce.”
109
  
In Manhattan, the mandatory protocol for domestic violence cases 
includes arrest and prosecution.
110
  In addition, during the 
defendant’s arraignment, the prosecutor is required to request a 
temporary protection order from the criminal court that prevents the 
defendant from contacting the victim or going to her home, even if 
that is also where he lives. 
111
  This order is issued regardless of 
whether the victim wants the protection.
112
  In addition, contact with 
children shared with the victim is banned.
113
   
The protective order is a powerful tool because even if a 
prosecutor would have a hard time prosecuting the underlying 
domestic violence charge because of the noncooperation of the 
victim, an arrest and prosecution can easily be made based on 
evidence of a defendant’s subsequent contact with the victim or 
presence in the home.
114
  The order is considered violated even if the 
victim was the one to initiate contact,
115
 and unannounced home 
visits by police officers are routine in order to enforce these orders.
116
  
If a defendant is convicted of domestic abuse, the court can enter a 
final order of protection for a specified period of time.
117
  Even if 
there is no conviction, a final order of protection may be entered 
based upon a plea agreement or “an adjournment in contemplation of 
dismissal, which does not require the defendant’s acknowledgement 
                                                 
107
Rubenfeld, supra note ___ at 787. 
108
Rubenfeld, supra note ____ at 784. 
109 SUK, supra note ____ at 42. 
110 SUK, supra note ___, at 36-37. 
111 SUK, supra note ___, at 37. 
112
SUK, supra note ___, at 38. 
113 SUK, supra note ___, at 38. 
114 SUK, supra note ___, at 38-39. 
115
SUK, supra note ___, at 38. 
116 SUK, supra note ___, at 38. 
117 SUK, supra note ___, at 42. 
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of guilt and is ‘deemed a nullity’ after a year if the defendant has met 
the conditions specified by the prosecutor.”
118
  These options are 
appealing to a defendant who has been in jail since arraignment or to 
a defendant who does not want to risk jail time because of a 
conviction.
119
  They are also appealing to those defendants who do 
not want to risk losing their jobs because of the amount of time they 




Under the practice of state-imposed de facto divorce, the 
criminal justice system has moved beyond arrest and prosecution into 
actually controlling intimate relationships.  This fact may not be 
troubling to many because they equate all domestic violence cases to 
the Coercive Controlling Violence model of abuse.
121
  Under this 
model, physical violence is part of a larger pattern of control, 
intimidation, and emotional abuse that the abuser wields over his 
partner.
122
  This type of abuse is frequent and severe and often 
escalates over time, but not all intimate violence falls under this 
category.
123
  There are circumstances where couples have managed to 
end the abuse in their relationships.
124
  This may particularly be the 
case with minor acts of violence, which often are the subject of state-
imposed de facto divorce in Manhattan                                                               
because the District Attorney’s office defines domestic violence so 
broadly.
125
  This policy, therefore, strongly curtails one’s ability to 
maintain intimate relationships (an ability that the Supreme Court has 
connected with one’s personal fulfillment and self-identification).
126
  
It also prevents batterers from visiting their children, since criminal 
courts do not have the jurisdiction to issue orders on visitation or 
custody.
127




                                                 
118 SUK, supra note ___, at 42. 
119 SUK, supra note ___, at 42-43. 
120 SUK, supra note ___, at 43. 
121 Bailey, supra note _____, at 1297. 
122 Bailey, supra note _____, at 1297. 
123 Bailey, supra note _____, at 1297. 
124 Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression?  Women’s Lives, Violence, and 
Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 76-77 (Martha Albertson Fineman & 
Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994). 
125 SUK, supra note _____ at 35-37. 
126 See supra Part ____. 
127 SUK, supra note ____, at 44. 
128 See, e.g., State v. Ross, No. 35448-5-I, 1996 WL 524116, at *3-4 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 
16, 1996) (concluding that the compelling state interest of preventing future domestic 
violence crimes outweighed the fundamental right to marry).  
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 The poor and women of color are the most vulnerable to these 
policies.
129
  As Suk notes, “[t]he initial arrest that sets the [criminal 
justice] wheels in motion is much more likely to occur if people live 
in close quarters in buildings with thin walls, and neighbors can 
easily hear a disturbance and call the police…Most people arrested 
for [domestic violence] in Manhattan are black or Hispanic.”
130
  Yes, 
the initial surveillance may be by one’s neighbors and not by the 
state, but the ultimate result is the same:  the state has greater access 
to the intimate details of one’s life, which leads to less decisional 
privacy.
131
   Those who are middle-class are more likely to have the 
privilege of limited accessibility.
132
  Thus, a domestic violence victim 
living in a house in the suburbs with a relative amount of distance 
from others will be less accessible, and therefore will more likely 
have more decisional privacy. 
 
b. Economic Vulnerability 
 
As illustrated by the previous section, criminal justice 
intervention is often premised on the notion that the victim must 
separate from her batterer.  Separation, however, can sometimes 
make a victim economically vulnerable.  A domestic violence victim 
faces a fifty percent chance that her income will fall below the 
poverty level if she leaves her batterer.
133
  Indeed, a significant 
number of those in the homeless population are domestic violence 
victims and their children.
134
  These vulnerabilities also exist under 
state-imposed de facto divorce because a criminal court does not 
have the jurisdiction to issue orders regarding financial support.
135
  
As a result, victims often receive no support during these 
separations.
136
  Moreover, if convicted, a batterers’ criminal record 
can also have negative economic consequences for the family 
because those with convictions often have difficulty finding and 
maintaining employment.
137
  Immigrant abusers who are convicted 
                                                 
129 SUK, supra note ____, at 45.  
130 SUK, supra note ____, at 45.  
131 See supra Part _____. 
132 ALLEN, supra note ___, at 61. 
133 Lininger, supra note _____, at 769. 
134 Mahoney, supra note ____ at 62.  Ongoing domestic abuse can jeopardize a victim’s 
employment, and victims often lose their jobs as a direct or indirect result of abuse.  Aiken 
& Goldwasser, supra note ___, at  160.  A spotty work record and poor credit hinder the 
ability of some women to get adequate housing.  Id. at 161. 
135 SUK, supra note _____, at 44. 
136 SUK, supra note _____, at 44. 
137 DEVAH PAGER & BRUCE WESTERN, INVESTIGATING PRISONER REENTRY:  THE IMPACT OF 
CONVICTION STATUS ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROPOSETS OF YOUNG MEN 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants 228584.pdf .  Even a misdemeanor conviction can 
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may be subject to deportation, which can be particularly problematic 
for their partners if they are the main economic providers.
138
  Many 
immigrant women without proper legal counsel also have been 
deported after pleading guilty in response to a dual arrest.
139
   
In addition, those women who publicly disclose their abuse 
often find that they have difficulty maintaining employment.
140
  
There have been cases where victims who have chosen to take legal 
action against their perpetrators have been terminated because they 
had to miss work to attend court dates and engage in other necessary 
steps in the criminal justice and safety planning processes.
141
  
Moreover, there is evidence that some employers terminate 
employees based on pure prejudice against domestic violence 
victims.
142
  Given the fact that jurisdictions are beginning to allow 
electronic records on legal actions to become public,
143
 it is 
becoming easier for employers to act on such prejudices: an 
employer can simply search an individual’s name, find out that she 
was a party to a domestic violence matter, and terminate or refuse to 
hire her without her even knowing about it.   
There have also been cases where landlords have denied 
housing or evicted domestic violence victims and where insurance 
companies have denied them coverage based on prejudices.
144
  
Maintaining housing can be particularly challenging for victims who 
opt to stay with partners convicted of abuse, since even a 
misdemeanor can make it difficult to rent an apartment.
145
  A 
misdemeanor can also make one ineligible for public housing for a 
period of time in some jurisdictions.
146
  Those with felonies are 
ineligible for public housing for five years.
147
 In addition, under 
                                                                                                                 
bar eligibility for numerous professional licenses and can affect food stamp eligibility.  
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 .S. CAL. L. REV. ____ (2012). 
138 Coker, supra note _____, at 1048-49. 
139 Coker, supra note _____, at 1048-49. 
140 Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace:  The Explosion of State 




143See, e.g., Maryland Judiciary Case Search, 
www.casesearch.courts.state.md.us/inquiry/inquiry-index.jsp and Missouri Judiciary Case 
Search, www.courts.mo.go/casenet. 
144 Leigh Goodmark, State, National, and International Legal Initiatives to Address Violence 
Against Women, in  SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 191, 193-95 (Claire M. 
Renzetti et al. eds., 2011).  In addition, under federal law, individuals may be evicted from 
public housing if they are “associated” with criminal activity.   
145
 Natapoff, supra note _____ at ______.   
146
 Natapoff, supra note _____ at ______.   
147 MICELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW :  MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 141 (2010).   
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federal law, individuals may be evicted from public housing if they 
are “associated” with criminal activity,
148
 which arguably could 
include a domestic violence victim.   There are states that have 
enacted laws to combat some of these practices, but because statutory 
language and court interpretations vary, many victims still have to 
worry about these consequences.
149
  For all of these economic 
reasons, domestic violence victims may feel the need to keep the 




   
c. Safety 
 
Separation can also be particularly dangerous for many 
domestic violence victims.  Martha Mahoney has documented the 
phenomenon of “separation violence”
151
  “At least half of women 
who leave their abusers are followed and harassed or further attacked 
by them.  In one study of interspousal homicide, more than half of 
the men who killed their spouses did so when the partners were 
separated.”
152
   
Empirical research suggests that state intervention may create 
even more danger for some victims.  It was originally believed that 
stricter criminal justice policies would deter future intimate 
violence,
153
 This belief arose from studies conducted by Lawrence 
Sherman in the 1980’s.
154
  Replications of these studies, however, 
suggest that while arrest may deter the violence from those who have 
something to lose, such as employment, it may actually lead to an 
increased level of violence for those men who are African-American, 
                                                 
148
 Id. at 144. 
149 Id. 
150Ola W. Barnett, Why Battered Women Do Not Leave, Part 1:  External Inhibiting Factors 
Within Society,  1 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE AND ABUSE 343, 347-49 (2000) (citing several studies 
that show a positive association between a lack of independent income and a woman’s 
inability to leave an abusive relationship); Hee Yun Lee et al., When Does a Battered 
Woman Seek Help From the Police?  The Role of Battered Women’s Functionality, 25 J. 
FAM. VIOLENCE 195, 196 (2010) (citing research that has found that “[w]omen who are 
financially dependent on the perpetrator are also less likely to call [the] police”);  Sack, 
supra note _____, at 1734 (arguing that the number one reason women stay with batterers is 
economic dependence and the most likely predictor of whether a battered woman will 
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151 Mahoney, supra note ___, at 63-64. 
152 Mahoney, supra note ___, at 63-64. 
153 Bailey, supra note _____, at 1292. 
154 Richard A. Berk et al., Studies: A Bayesian Analysis of the Colorado Springs Spouse 
Abuse Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170, 170–71 (1992). 




  Moreover, even though intimate 
partner homicides generally have decreased in the past twenty years, 
one study has found that homicides are fifty percent higher in states 
that have mandatory laws than in states without these laws.
156
  The 
reason for this increase is not entirely clear,
157
 but at the very least 
these statistics suggest the need for a serious re-evaluation of how 
these laws affect victims’ safety.  
  
 d. Loss of Children 
 
 If a woman publicly discloses that she has been abused by her 
partner, there is a very real risk that she could lose her children.  In 
some cases, police officers have threatened to take a victim’s 
children from her if she makes multiple calls to the police reporting 
abuse in one evening.
158
   In the mid-1990’s, Kristian Miccio was one 
of the first to identify a troubling trend in various jurisdictions, 
including New York, where women were charged with neglect 
simply because their children witnessed their abuse.
159
  In 2001, a 
class action was filed in the Eastern District of New York on behalf 
of all battered mothers and their children who had been separated 
because there had been abuse in the home.
160
  Sharwline Nicholson, 
the named plaintiff in the case, was the quintessential example of this 
pattern and practice.  At the time of her assault, Nicholson was 
separated from her infant daughter’s father, who lived in South 
                                                 
155Id.;  see also J. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchinson, Female Spouse Abuse and the Police 
Response:  The Charlotte, North Carolina Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73, 
115 (1992);  Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal 
Careers:  The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
137, 168 (1992).   
156 Radha Iyengar, Does the Certainty of Arrest Reduce Domestic Violence?  Evidence From 
Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws, 93 J. OF PUB. ECON 85, 97 (2009). 
157Iyengar interprets the results from her study as suggesting that victims are less likely to 
contact the police when faced with mandatory laws.  Id.  “This failure to contact the police 
results in fewer interventions risking an increased probability of escalating violence.”  Id.  
She acknowledges, however, that it is an open question as to whether mandatory policies 
deter less serious violence.  Id.  In addition, to the extent that victims are not contacting the 
police because they are afraid they will not be adequately protected or because of the threat 
of dual arrest, she leaves open the possibility that mandatory policies could be more 
effective with stronger sentences that seriously incapacitate abusers and with more 
comprehensive police training on how to properly apply the law.  Id.  She also stresses the 
importance of providing resources to victims so that they are able to leave an abusive 
relationship.  Id. 
158 JENKINS & DAVIDSON, supra note ____ at 78. 
159 Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and Children:  Deconstructing the Myth of the 
Passive Battered Mother and the “Protected Child” in Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 ALB. 
L. REV. 1087, 1088-90 (1995). 
160 Jill M. Zuccardy, Nicholson v. Williams:  the Case, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 655, 661 (2005). 




  During their actual relationship, this man had never 
threatened her or physically abused her, but during one of his visits 
with their child after the relationship ended, he and Nicholson got 
into an argument and he severely beat her.
 162
   Her son was at school 
and her daughter was asleep in another room at the time of the 
beating.
163
  Nicholson called 911, and her abuser left the scene.
164
 
Nicholson suffered severe injuries including a broken arm, a 
concussion, and numerous bleeding wounds throughout her body.
165
  
Before the ambulance came, she contacted her neighbor and asked 
her to care for her daughter and to pick up her son from school.
166
  
Nicholson also provided the police with as much information as she 
could so that they could catch her abuser.
167
 
While Nicholson was in the hospital, the police went to her 
neighbor’s home with guns drawn and seized the children.
168
  They 
called Nicholson and told her that her children could not stay with 
strangers and that she would have to find a relative to take them.
169
  
Nicholson called her cousin, who lived in New Jersey, but when the 
cousin went to the police station to pick up the children, she was told 
that she could not take the children out of state.
170
   
Nicholson received a call from the Administration for 
Children’s Services (“ACS”) early the next morning telling her that 
they had her children and that she would have to go to court to get 
them back.
171
  Against her doctor’s advice, she left the hospital 
immediately to find her children.
172
  It took ACS five days to file a 
petition in court and during that time Nicholson had no idea where 
her children were.
173
  Nicholson was ultimately charged with child 
neglect for “engaging in domestic violence” when she actually was 
the victim of her ex-boyfriend’s brutal beating. 
174
  Her children were 
eventually returned back to her, fourteen days after the family court 
ordered their return and twenty-one days after the initial 
                                                 
161 Id. at 657. 







169 Id.  Apparently, what the police told Nicholson was not even a correct statement of New 
York law.  Id. 




174 Id.   




  There was evidence that the children suffered abuse 
and neglect during their time in foster care.
176
   
The Nicholson class action represented many other plaintiffs 
with similarly disturbing stories.
177
  One of the plaintiffs was forced 
to quit her job and to resort to public assistance because she was only 
allowed to have custody of her children if she agreed to stay in a 
homeless shelter and the shelter’s strict curfew conflicted with her 
work schedule.
178
  The actions and demands of ACS underscore the 
lack of understanding that the agency had about the complex 
decisions that domestic violence victims must make.  Unsurprisingly, 
these plaintiffs were primarily poor, women of color.
179
 
The Eastern District of New York ultimately held that the 
systematic removal of battered mothers without adequate 
investigations as to whether they were actually neglectful was a 
violation of these mothers’ procedural and substantive due process 
rights.
180




Dr. Evan Stark’s research on the effect of domestic abuse on 
children was highly influential in the court’s decision.
182
  While 
researchers initially believed that exposure to domestic violence 
creates substantial harm for children, Dr. Stark ultimately found that 
these studies were methodologically weak.
183
  In his subsequent 
research, Stark found that “the vast majority [of severely abused 
women] exhibits unimpaired capacities to parent.”
184
  “Perhaps the 
most telling findings are that children of battered mothers in battered 
women shelters reported relatively high and stable scores on their 
self-concept across time, and exhibited overall adjustment that fell 
within the range of what is considered normal.”
185
  In terms of 
witnessing abuse, over eighty percent of children “retain their overall 
                                                 
175 Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 172. 
176 Id. During a visit with her children, Nicholson witnessed a rash on her daughter’s face 
and yellow pus running from her nose.  Id.  Her son had a swollen eye.  Id. 
177 Id. at 173-93.   
178 Id. at 176. 
179 Evan Stark, Nicholson v. Williams Revisited:  When Good People Do Bad Things, 82 
DENV. U. L. REV. 691, 693 (2005). 
180Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 262.  
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supra note _____, at  670. 
182 Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 198. 
183 Stark, supra note ____, at  698.   
184 Evan Stark, The Battered Mother in the Child Protective Service Caseload, 23 WOMEN’S 
RIGHTS LAW REPORTER 107, 111 (2002).  Ninety-eight percent were emotionally available to 
their children, ninety-one percent continued to value parenting, and ninety-one percent 
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185 Id. at 111-12. 




  Over seventy percent of children in a 
violent home become normal functioning parents.
187
  In other words, 
many abused women are good mothers who just happen to be in bad 
circumstances and who parent children who ultimately become well-
adjusted, functioning adults.  Furthermore, as was the case for 
Nicholson’s children, removing a child from her abused mother and 
placing her in foster care can often result in even more harm.
188
  
 Perhaps the Nicholson case will lead to a sea-change in the 
way that battered women are viewed as mothers.  There is evidence 
that ACS did dramatically reduce the number of mothers cited for 
neglect simply because they were abused.
189
  The reality is, however, 
that not all New York judges liked the Nicholson opinion.
190
  For this 
reason, it is not clear how many abused women are still being 
punished based on pretextual grounds.
191
  It remains to be seen 
whether abused mothers can fully trust the system to understand the 
complexity of their situations and to not punish them as mothers 
simply because they have been abused. 
 
 e. The Stigmatic Nature of the Criminal Justice System 
 
 Even when engaging with well-informed legal actors who 
have the best of intentions, criminal prosecutions are simply not 
pleasant.  Regardless of how the general public perceives domestic 
violence victims, it is not a good thing to be associated with the 
criminal justice system—in any way, shape, or form.  First, the 
victim has to retell her story over and over again to the police, the 
prosecutor, the judge, and anyone else who is charged with helping 
her case.  Many victims may find this process particularly difficult 
because they must relive the violent experience again and again, and 
the adversarial nature of the prosecution process emphasizes their 
role as the victim when they may not view themselves in such a 
light.
192
  Second, the victim has to confront her abuser in a public 
forum and to put the abuse on the public record.  Even if the victim is 
not fearful of her batterer, it is still difficult to confront someone who 
she still may love and with whom she shares a history (and probably 
                                                 
186 Id. at 116. 
187 Id. at 117. 
188 Id. at 119. 
189 Stark, supra note _____, at 718.   
190 Zuccardy, supra note _____ ,at  670. 
191 Stark, supra note _____, at  719.   
192 See Mahoney, supra note _____, at 10-19 (arguing that most victims of domestic violence 
do not view themselves as “battered women” because of the negative stereotypes associated 
with victimization that are not consistent with victims viewing their experiences as periodic 
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children).  Furthermore, documenting the abuse on the public record 
stigmatizes the batterer because he is marked as a criminal.  As 
already discussed, the conviction of the batterer has negative social 
and economic consequences for the entire family.
193
     
 Some women, especially those involved in extremely violent 
relationships, are willing to engage in this difficult process because 
they believe that it is the only way to stop the violence in their lives.  
Indeed, fear of serious injury or death is often an impetus for women 
to seek a criminal justice response to the violence.
194
  But the 
stigmatizing public nature of the criminal justice system also causes 
some women to avoid arrest and prosecution altogether.   
 
 Thus, mandatory policies really do threaten to take over and 
direct the totality of many victims’ lives.  State-imposed de facto 
divorce literally breaks up intimate relationships and families that 
some victims may think are worth salvaging for their own personal 
fulfillment and self-identification.  Criminal justice intervention has 
also led to many good mothers losing custody of their children.  Even 
if others do not agree with these women’s choices in intimate 
partners, we should always closely scrutinize the circumstances 
under which the state chooses to aggressively reorder a family’s 
structure.  Mandatory policies also make many victims economically 
vulnerable, unsafe, and subject to all of the stigmatic, social, and 
economic harm that derives from association with the criminal justice 
system in general.  These facts suggest that although it is important to 
recognize the public aspects of domestic violence, it is just as 
important to recognize that it has private aspects as well. 
 
 
 . IV.THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ASPECTS OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
 
One of the reasons that domestic violence victims may be 
experiencing less privacy is that the privacy right as presented in Roe 
is arguably theoretically inconsistent with the notion that the state has 
an obligation to protect women.  It is interesting to note that at the 
same time that feminists and activists in the women’s liberation 
movement were highlighting how privacy undermined the safety of 
women in the home, the Supreme Court was using privacy to secure 
                                                 
193 See note _____ and accompanying text. 
194 HILLARY POTTER, BATTLE CRIES:  BLACK WOMEN & INTIMATE PARTNER ABUSE 145 (2008);  
see also Lee, supra note ____, at 196 (citing research that found that the “more severe and 
the more frequent the abuse, the more likely women call the police”). 
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the rights of contraception use and abortion.  Activists in the 
women’s movement were quite involved in the reproductive rights 
cases, but apparently the two movements did not share or compare 
legal strategies; it was not until after Roe that anti-domestic-violence 
activists saw any potential theoretical inconsistency that the case 
created
195
 and criticism internal to the movement began to emerge.
196
   
Catharine MacKinnon argued that the concept of privacy is 
dangerous for women because the Court treats privacy as a negative 
right, or a right to be free from governmental intrusion.
197
  Under this 
view of privacy, the government has no affirmative duty to protect an 
individual’s rights.  With respect to domestic violence, men’s right to 
be left alone in their homes historically meant that their partners 
could be beaten without governmental intrusion.   
This negative view of the privacy right, however, is also 
problematic for MacKinnon with respect to rights that purportedly 
are for the benefit of women.  For example, while the Court has 
recognized a privacy right that allows a woman to choose whether to 
have an abortion,
198 
it has refused to obligate the government to pay 
for her abortion
199
.  In other words, while the government must leave 
women alone in making the decision whether to have an abortion, it 
is not required to foster the conditions to make that choice easier.
200
  
Thus, with respect to abortion, the Court has reinforced the 
public/private dichotomy that feminists have so vehemently 
critiqued.
201
   
                                                 
195 RAMBO, supra note ____, at  91.   
196 RAMBO, supra note _____, at 87-89.  
197 MACKINNON, supra note _____ at 184-194;  see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some 
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 385-
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89-90.  
198
 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
199
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (“Although the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government interference 
with freedom of choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not 
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advantages of that freedom.”),  
200
 Harris, 448 U.S. at 316 (“[A]lthough government may not place obstacles in the 
path of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not 
of its won creation.”) 
201
 See supra Part ____. 
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According to MacKinnon, the problem with this view is that 
it presumes that there is equality in the private sphere.
202
 With respect 
to reproductive control, however, she does not view women as being 
equal to men.
203
  Furthermore, MacKinnon argues that reproductive 
control is necessarily affected by the public sphere in the form of 
“social learning, lack of information, social pressure, custom, poverty 
and enforced economic dependence, sexual force, and ineffective 
enforcement of laws against sexual assault.”
204
  Yet, when privacy is 
treated as a negative right, the state has no obligation to intervene and 
to address these inequalities that exist in the so-called private 
sphere.
205
  If a woman cannot afford an abortion, MacKinnon argues, 
she does not have a true choice when it comes to reproductive 
control, which is essential for sex equality.
206
   
As a result, MacKinnon argues that this “is why feminism has 
had to explode the private . . . . Feminism confronts the fact that 
women have no privacy to lose or to guarantee . . . . To confront the 
fact that women have no privacy is to confront the intimate 
degradation of women as the public order.”
207
  To MacKinnon, the 
“right to privacy is a right of men ‘to be let alone’ to oppress women 
one at a time.”
208
 
MacKinnon is correct that decisional privacy does not mean 
anything if an individual does not have adequate choices available to 
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 MACKINNON, supra note ____, at 194 (“Privacy law assumes women are equal to men in 
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her.  These choices are necessarily affected by the public sphere, 
which relates to the key feminist insight that the personal is political.  
If a victim chooses to get a protective order against her batterer, the 
order cannot be effective without a state that enforces it.
209
  If a 
victim chooses to involve the criminal justice system, this solution 
cannot be effective if the police ignore her calls for help or if 
prosecutors ignore her desire to pursue prosecution.  Furthermore, 
many victims will feel trapped in a violent relationship because 
inequities in the public sphere make it infeasible to leave the 
relationship; as long as they are unable to find economic 
empowerment in the public sphere, many victims feel that they have 
no choice but to stay in a violent home.
210
  Finally, in order to protect 
their children, domestic violence victims need a state system that 
understands that a woman can be both a victim of domestic violence 
and a good mother at the same time. 
Yet, when the government does take affirmative steps to 
provide some individuals with material support, it is often the case 
that it already explodes the private.  For example, when welfare 
programs were first created in the United States, many mothers had 
to comply with “standards of sexual and reproductive” behavior in 
order to receive payments from many states.
211
  Many women must 
currently participate in mandatory paternity proceedings that 
scrutinize their intimate lives in order to be entitled to receive welfare 
benefits.
212
  The Supreme Court has also limited welfare recipients’ 
entitlement to Fourth Amendment protection by holding that they 
may be subject to warrantless home visits by state actors.
213
  Because 
of their dependence on the state, poor families and families of color 
are also more likely to be exposed to the child protection system.
214
  
                                                 
209 See Aiken & Goldwater, supra note _____, at 153-54  (noting very few arrest rates for 
violations of protective orders). 
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213 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971). 
214 Dorothy Roberts, The Dialectic of Privacy and Punishment in the Gendered Regulation 
of Parenting, 5 STAN. J. CR. R. & C. L. 191, 194 (2009) (“In Chicago, most child protection 
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Furthermore, pregnant women who have to use public assistance to 
pay for their prenatal care  must undergo intrusive questioning about 
their nutrition and finances, whether their child is wanted, their 
history of parenting, their immigration status, whether they have 
engaged in criminal activities to support themselves, and their 
contraceptive strategies to prevent future births.
215
   
Interestingly, families that meet the middle-class, 
heterosexual nuclear family norm do receive subsidies from the 
government as well as respect for their privacy.
216
  These subsidies 
come in the form of Federal Housing Authority or Veterans Affairs 
loans at below market interest rates, employer subsidized health and 
life insurance, and tax deductions for the interest paid on home 
mortgage loans.
217
  It is only in the context of those who do not fit the 
nuclear family norm, including single mothers and the poor, that 
American culture finds it paradoxical to provide governmental 
support while still protecting one’s privacy.
218
  This history of 
governmental intrusion in subordinated groups’ lives is the reason 
why some African-American feminist scholars challenge Catharine 
MacKinnon’s view that privacy is a problematic concept for all 
women.
219
  Oppressed people need more privacy, not less, in order to 
protect them from a state that historically has been overly intrusive. 
 Some feminist scholars have advocated for a more “positive” 
view of privacy.  This view recognizes that the public and private 
spheres are interrelated and acknowledges that it is important for the 
government to provide individuals with some privacy , even when it 
chooses to provide affirmative measures to maintain equality in the 
                                                                                                                 
The overrepresentation of black children in the foster care population, then, represents 
massive state supervision and dissolution of families concentrated in black 
neighborhoods.”);  see also Annette Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of 
Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM  683, 770 (2001).  As is the case with  domestic 
violence criminal justice policies, child welfare policies probably originate from a legitimate 
and benign motivation, but they result in overreaching in the populations most vulnerable to 
privacy loss:  the poor and people of color. 
215
 Khiara M. Bridges , Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J. OF L. & GENDER 
113, 118-34 (2011). 
216






 But see Crenshaw, supra note ___, at 1257 (arguing that for members of racially 
subordinated groups the home may “function as a safe haven from the indignities of life in a 
racist society”); Roberts, supra note _____, at 1470-71 (arguing that the private sphere can 
often be a place of solace from racial oppression for many women of color and that “the 
imminent danger faced by poor women of color comes from the public sphere, not the 
private”). 




   In the domestic violence context, Elizabeth 
Schneider has argued for an affirmative right of privacy “that is 
grounded on equality, and is viewed as an aspect of autonomy that 
protects bodily integrity and makes abuse impermissible.”
221
  
Drawing upon Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion in Roe v. Wade, 
she notes the importance in linking women’s privacy rights to liberty, 
rather than being limited by the narrow vision of privacy that is 
implied in some Supreme Court jurisprudence.
222
  Instead of simply 
providing a passive right to just be left alone, liberty underscores the 
importance of autonomy, self-determination, and self-expression.
223
  
Liberty creates a right to be free from violence, and therefore, the 
state is no longer justified in failing to protect women.
224
 
Dorothy Roberts acknowledges that the “definition of privacy 
as a purely negative right serves to exempt the state from any 
obligation to ensure the social conditions and resources necessary for 
self-determination and autonomous decision-making.”
225
  Instead of 
heeding Catharine MacKinnon’s call to explode the private, however, 
she advocates for “an affirmative guarantee of personhood and 
autonomy.”
226
  As an example, she argues that because African-
American women historically have been devalued as mothers, the 
prosecution of African-American drug addicted mothers continues 
the racist governmental practice of infringing on African-American 
women’s right to decisional privacy with respect to bearing 
children.
227
 Furthermore, because African-American women 
historically have been the recipients of inadequate health care, 
African-American drug addicted mothers are entitled to 
governmentally provided drug treatment and prenatal care.
228
  Under 
this view, acknowledging these women’s right to decisional privacy 
does not negate the government’s obligation to foster the conditions 
for racial, gender, and class equality. 
                                                 
220
 See Roberts, supra note ____, at  1478. Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, in 
THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 36, 53 (Martha Alberston Fineman & Roxanne 
Mykitiuk eds., 1994). 
221 Schneider, supra note _____ at 36, 53. 
222 Id. at 52. 
223 Id.  Justice Kennedy echoed this sentiment in Lawrence. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 
(“Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, 
and certain intimate contact”). 
224 Schneider, supra note _____, at 53.  See also RAMBO, supra note ___ at 212-221 
(advocating for an affirmative right of privacy based on autonomy and bodily integrity that 
would ensure state protection for domestic violence victims). 
225 Roberts, supra note ____, at  1478. 
226 Roberts, supra note ____, at 1479. 
227 Roberts, supra note ____, at 1471. 
228 Roberts, supra note ____, at 1477-80. 
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When one acknowledges the interrelatedness of the public 
and private spheres, these scholars demonstrate that it is not 
theoretically inconsistent to expect the state to protect women from 
violence in their homes while recognizing that they are entitled to 
some privacy.  Furthermore, it is not necessary for the Supreme 
Court to constitutionalize this perspective in order for legislatures 
and policymakers to provide these protections.  According to the 
present Court, victims of private violence do not have a constitutional 
right to affirmative protection from the state.
229
  Nevertheless, state 
legislatures have still chosen to enact domestic violence criminal 
justice policies that encourage this type of protection.   
 Similarly, constitutional law in its present state does not 
provide a right to privacy that precludes the criminal justice system 
from intervening in domestic violence matters every time that the 
victim wishes.  Lawrence v. Texas makes it clear that the state can 
define the meaning of a relationship or set its boundaries if someone 
is injured or if there is an “abuse of an institution the law protects.”
230
  
In other words, regulating domestic violence through the criminal 
justice system is well within the state’s domain.  Even if I am not 
able to persuade the Supreme Court to create a constitutional privacy 
right for domestic violence victims, however, it is my hope that I can 
persuade policymakers and legislators to rethink current mandatory 
criminal justice policies based on normative constitutional privacy 
principles.
231
  The following Section will discuss some initial steps 
that they could take toward such criminal justice reform. 
  
V. WHAT’S NEXT? 
 
 A criminal justice solution to domestic violence is a 
complicated proposition for domestic violence victims.  The purpose 
of this Article is to make the case that mandatory criminal justice 
policies in particular implicate privacy concerns; this fact is 
something of grave concern, and policymakers, feminist activists, 
and victims’ advocates should acknowledge and address it.  
                                                 
229
 Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (holding that there is no 
procedural due process right to the enforcement of a protective order); DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1989) (holding that 
there is not a substantive due process right to protection from private violence).   
230 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
231 See Roberts, supra note ___, at 1426 (asserting that her constitutional arguments “might 
be directed more fruitfully to legislatures than to courts”); Robin West, Progressive and 
Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 717 (1990) (characterizing progressive 
interpretations of the constitutional guarantees of liberty and equality as “political ideals to 
guide legislations, rather than as legal restraints on legislations”). 
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Abolishing mandatory policies without thinking carefully about the 
appropriate alternatives, however, would be a mistake.  While a 
complete and thoughtful discussion regarding what these alternatives 
should be is beyond the scope of this Article, I think it is important 
that policymakers recognize that it may be possible to make the 
criminal justice system more effective without imposing mandatory 
policies; the fact that there is a potential line-drawing problem in 
determining when the state should intervene in a violent relationship 
is not an excuse to take victims’ privacy less seriously.  In addition, a 
grassroots approach to domestic violence must work in conjunction 
with a criminal justice solution in order to help a greater number of 
victims.  
 
A.  A Criminal Justice System Without Mandatory Policies. 
 
 Given that the determination of whether there is probable 
cause of domestic abuse involves discretion, there is some evidence 
that some police officers are nonresponsive even under mandatory 
policies.
232
    For this reason, I acknowledge that many police officers 
still may not take domestic violence seriously.  In that case, a 
discretionary policy that focuses more on the wishes of the victim 
regarding arrest and prosecution could create the risk that the 
criminal justice system will become nonresponsive to domestic 
violence victims just as it was a few decades ago.  Since societal 
views in general have changed regarding this issue, however, I am 
hopeful that most officers do feel that they have a role in keeping 
women safe from abusive partners.
233
   
 The tougher problem is that success in our current criminal 
justice system is measured by the number of arrests, prosecutions, 
and convictions that are executed.
234
  Without mandatory policies, 
the police may get tired of making repeat visits to the same home 
with no resulting arrests or prosecutions to show for their efforts.
235
   
There are two potential solutions to this particular issue.  The first 
would require a radical transformation of the criminal justice system.  
Instead of success being measured on a retributitive basis, goals such 
as rehabilitation and restorative justice would become more 
prominent.
236
  With these goals in mind, success would not be 
                                                 
232 Sack, supra note ___, at 1696. 
233
 But see Bailey, supra note ___ at 1279 (discussing evidence that a significant of 
police officers may themselves be batterers). 
234
PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE:  A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE  93-94, 116-18 (2009).  
235 Bailey, supra note ____ at 1272-73. 
236 Thus far empirical studies suggest that batterer intervention programs that focus on 
rehabilitating the batterer have had limited effectiveness.  Melissa Labriola et al., Do 
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measured by the number of arrests and prosecutions that are made 
against batterers each year.  It would be measured by whether a 
particular arrest kept a woman safe in that moment, by whether a 
batterer could change his behavior, and by how many families were 
able to move past the violence and remain intact.  Like many other 
scholars,
237
  I believe a move away from the intensively retributivist 
focus of our current criminal justice system would be a good thing in 
general, not solely in the domestic violence context.  I am not 
convinced that the conservatization
238
 of our criminal justice system 
over the past few decades has made our society safer,
239
 and in many 




 Nevertheless, I am a realist.  For this reason, I do not think 
that the retributivist focus of the American criminal justice system is 
going to change any time soon.  A more realistic approach would be 
to make the criminal justice system more appealing to more victims 
by addressing some of the reasons why they choose to not engage 
with it.
241
  Some of these reasons are beyond the scope of the 
criminal justice system, as they are rooted in the social, political, and 
economic structure of our country.
242
  Yet, some jurisdictions have 
made successful attempts at addressing other reasons.   
Not understanding the complexity of the dynamics of 
domestic violence, the police and prosecutors often get frustrated and 
impatient when victims seem hesitant to follow through with the 
prosecutions of their batterers.
243
  As a result, they sometimes make 
                                                                                                                 
Batterer Programs Reduce Recidivism?  Results from a Randomized Trial in the Bronx, 25 
JUST. QUARTERLY 252, 279 (2008).  Some stress, however, that even a small reduction in 
recidivism could translate to eliminating violence for thousands of women.  Larry W. 
Bennett et al., Partner Completion and Re-Arrest in a Batterer Intervention System, 17 
RESEARCH ON SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE 42, 42 (2007); George L. Stuart et al., Improving 
Batterer Intervention Programs Through Theory-Based Research, 298 JAMA 560, 561 
(2007).  Others blame these programs’ limited effectiveness on their “one-size-fits all” 
nature and suggest a more targeted approach that moves beyond the feminist and cognitive 
behavioral therapy models and that considers the different backgrounds of batterers.  Stuart, 
supra note _____, at 560-61;  see also Beth S. Catlett et al., Men’s Gendered Constructions 
of Intimate Partner Violence as Predictors of Court-Mandated Batterer Treatment Drop 
Out, 45 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCH. 107, 121 (2010).  
237 See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note ____ at 23-40; Gruber, supra note ____ at 818-819. 
238 By using the term “conservatism” I do not mean to suggest that “war on crime” political 
rhetoric belongs soley to conservative or Republican politicians.  Instead, it refers more 
generally to the shift toward retributivist type goals within criminal justice policies.  This 
focus has been embraced by both political parties.  Bailey, supra note ____ at 1266-68. 
239 See Richard A. Oppel Jr., Steady Decline in Major Crime Baffles Experts, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 23, 2011, at A1. 
240See BUTLER, supra note ____, at 137-40, 229-33. 
241 Bailey, supra note ____, at 1276-1280. 
242 Bailey, supra note ____, at 1280-1293. 
243 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note ____, at 189.   
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victims “prove” that they are serious about pursuing prosecution by 
creating additional procedural hurdles.
244
   It has also been 
documented that the police often do not believe a victim’s claim of 
abuse.
245
  Instead, they believe the victim is trying to manipulate the 
system, such as trying to get more child support from the partner.
246
  
Women of color particularly face skepticism from the police because 
bruises are more difficult to see on dark skin.
247
  In addition, many 
African-American women tend to defend themselves from physical 
abuse by fighting back.
248
  Instead of getting the protection that they 
seek,
249
 this defensive behavior often leads to the victims being 
arrested themselves under dual-arrest policies,
250
 For all of these 
reasons, victims often make the calculated choice not to engage with 
the state because they cannot rely upon it for protection.
251
  To 
address these problems, some cities have worked to better educate 
legal actors about domestic violence victims in order to improve their 
experience with the criminal justice system.
252
  
It also has been documented that many victims stop 
cooperating with the criminal justice system because they are not 
adequately informed about what to expect with respect to the 
prosecution process.
253
  They have unrealistic expectations about 
how long the process takes,
254
 or they are not confident that they are 
going to be adequately protected by the legal system
255
.   In response, 
some jurisdictions work more closely with the victims to make sure 
that they are better informed about the prosecution process.
256
   
 In addition, some jurisdictions have implemented a 
coordinated community response approach.  For those victims who 
                                                 
244 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note ____, at 189.  . 
245 POTTER, supra note ____ at 177.   
246 POTTER, supra note ____ at 177.   
247 POTTER, supra note ____ at 178. 
248 POTTER, supra note ____ at 47. 
249 Bailey, supra note _____, at 1289. 
250 Under dual-arrest policies, which many jurisdictions have, a police officer may make an 
arrest of both parties if they cannot determine who caused a domestic dispute.  See Bailey, 
supra note ____, at 1289. 
251 Bailey, supra note _____, at 1289.  See also Lisa R. Pruitt, Place Matters:  Domestic 
Violence and Rural Differences, 23 WIS. J. OF L., GENDER, & SOC’Y 349, 378-86 (2008) 
(describing the negative attitudes that victims living in rural areas experience from legal 
actors). 
252
 Hanna, supra note _____, at 1893. 
253 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note _____, at 189. 
254 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note _____, at 189. 
255 OFFICE JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S DEP’T JUST., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
RESEARCH:  SUMMARIES FOR JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS 13 (Barbara E. Smith ed., 
2003) (summarizing JOANNE BELKNAP ET AL., FACTORS RELATED TO DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE COURT DISPOSITIONS IN A LARGE URBAN AREA (2000)), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/202564.pdf). 
256 Bailey, supra note ____, at 1294. 
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are hesitant to engage with the criminal justice system because of 
limited access to material resources, some jurisdictions provide 
victims with immediate access to support services in the community 
during the intake process.
257
  Some jurisdictions also make it easier to 
obtain access to civil attorneys to help with protective orders, 
divorce, and child custody and support issues.
258
   
 There have also been attempts by some jurisdictions to 
improve their ability to adequately protect victims.  In Brooklyn, 
high-risk victims are given cell phones with speed dial to 911.
259
  
Some victims also are given pendants that are connected through the 
security company ADT.
260
  In Washington, D.C., courtrooms 
dedicated to domestic violence cases are staffed with several security 
guards.
261
  Whether these measures are actually keeping victims safer 
is not clear, but at least they are a step in the right direction and an 
attempt to address some of the safety issues that these victims face.  
As jurisdictions try these different approaches, they will be able to 
determine what works and what does not; victims who desire 
criminal justice intervention can then have more confidence that the 
state takes their safety seriously.
262
 
 Jurisdictions that have implemented a coordinated community 
response have higher participation rates from domestic violence 
victims.
263
  These statistics suggest that changing the views of legal 
actors toward domestic violence victims and addressing some of the 
practical obstacles that some victims face encourages them to engage 
more with the criminal justice system.  Perhaps if criminal justice 
actors saw more cooperation from domestic violence victims, even if 
not from all of them, they would be more willing to be responsive to 
these victims’ desires without the need for mandatory policies that 
force them to be responsive. 
Finally, while there may be victims who neither need nor 
want help from the criminal justice system, it may be the case that 
                                                 
257 Bailey, supra note ____, at 1294. 
258 Bailey, supra note ____, at 1294. 
259 Bailey, supra note ____, at 1295. 
260 Bailey, supra note ____, at 1294. 
261 EMILY SACK, CREATING A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT:  GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES 
55 (Lindsey Anderson et al. eds., (2002)). 
262 It may be the case that in some cases safety will not be a victim’s number one priority.  
See supra Part ____ for a discussion about how the state might balance its own interest in 
victim safety with the decisional privacy of victims. 
263 Bailey, supra note _____, at 1295.  It is possible, however, that these programs are most 
successful for high-risk victims who are in extreme danger and that they may not have the 
same success rates for less severe cases.  Bailey, supra note ____, at 1296.  Further research 
also is needed to ensure that these programs are not still coercing victims in ways that 
undermine their satisfaction with the criminal justice system.  Bailey, supra note ____, at 
1296. 
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there are women who do need and want help, but they do not ask for 
it because they fear losing control over their situations and becoming 
subject to greater state scrutiny.
264
  For example, perhaps a victim 
may be successful in stopping a violent episode by calling the police, 
but she would not want to take any further action against her batterer.  
Current policies would not allow her to make that type of choice.  If a 
victim’s violence is exposed to the criminal justice system by 
someone else, she may deny the abuse in order to stymie the 
prosecution process.  If she knew, however, that she could choose not 
to prosecute even if she admits the abuse, the criminal justice system 
could at least potentially provide a gateway to social services that she 
may actually desire.  There may also be victims who are wary of 
seeking informal support from family or friends out of a legitimate 
fear that they will then be pressured to engage with the state.  We 
must make sure that there are not victims who might otherwise seek 
help if they knew that they would have a say in how the violence they 
experience is ultimately handled. 
 
 B. When Should the Victim Have a Choice:  A Line-
Drawing Problem. 
 
 To be clear, I am not arguing that victims should always 
dictate whether a prosecutor proceeds with a prosecution against a 
batterer.  The criminal justice system works on behalf of the entire 
community, not just the victim.
265
  The state, as a representative of 
the community, certainly does have an interest in keeping women 
safe in their homes.  For this reason, there may be occasions when it 
is appropriate for the state to proceed with a prosecution regardless of 
the wishes of the victim.
266
   For example, evidence suggests that 
incarceration is the only way to keep victims and society at large safe 
from chronic, seriously violent abusers.
267
  For these types of abusers 
it may make sense to disregard the wishes of the victim out of 
concern for victim and public safety, as long as the state is willing to 
take on the responsibility of protecting both through serious 
incapacitation.
268
  In addition, the state may need to intervene when 
                                                 
264 Iyengar, supra note _____ at 97. 
265 Bailey, supra note _____ at 1257. 
266 Bailey, supra note ____ at 1273-74;   see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (asserting that 
the state can define the meaning of a relationship or set its boundaries if someone is injured 
or if there is an “abuse of an institution the law protects”). 
267 Bailey, supra note _____ at 1273. 
268 Unfortunately, batterers currently usually serve little or no jail time.  Cheryl Hanna, The 
Paradox of Hope:  The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1505, 1508, 1521-22 (1998). 
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children in the home are being harmed since protecting the safety of 
these children is also in the state’s interest.  
Yet as I have already argued, many victims do not suffer 
serious violence, and state intervention may actually put some in 
more danger.
269
  In addition, some evidence suggests that many 
children of domestic violence victims do not suffer serious physical 
or long-term emotional harm.
270
  It is on behalf of these victims that I 
hope to make the following point: because of the special nature of 
intimate relationships, there are benefits to conferring additional 
decisional privacy, and therefore respecting the wishes of most 
victims.  I acknowledge that there is a line-drawing problem in 
determining when the state’s interest in victim safety should 
outweigh a victim’s decisional privacy.  In fact, some may even 
argue that mandatory policies strike the perfect balance because they 
at least provide better assurance that the criminal justice system is 
responsive to those victims who need it; those women who do not 
want to engage with the system simply will not call the police. As 
already discussed, however, there is a racial and socio-economic 
disparity with respect to who can actually choose to engage with the 
criminal justice system.
271
  A policy that provides privacy only to 
whites or the middle-class and well-to-do is indefensible, immoral, 
and unacceptable. 
That it is not an easy task to determine in which cases the 
state should intervene is not reason enough to ignore the importance 
of privacy in domestic violence victims’ lives.  With respect to 
determining the seriousness of the physical harm to the victim, there 
have been attempts to use lethality experts to predict serious and 
escalating violence in a relationship.
272
  This type of work could be a 
starting point in determining when the state’s interest in safety should 
trump a victim’s desires.  This interest is only valid, however, if the 
                                                 
269 See infra Part _____. 
270 See infra Part _____. 
271 See infra Part ______. 
272 For example, the Target Abuser Call program in Chicago focuses on high-risk 
misdemeanor cases and focuses on risk factors such as strangulation, resisting arrest, 
violation of orders of protection, whether the victim has indicated she wants to end the 
relationship, public incidents of violence, and stressors such as the offender’s job status.  
Kimberly D. Bailey, The Aftermath of Crawford and Davis:  Deconstructing the Sound of 
Silence, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1, 50 (2009).   A lethality screen is also used by police 
departments in other states, including Maryland, which has seen a forty percent drop in 
domestic violence homicides since 2007.  Tim Stelloh, Fighting Back:  Has one state 




.  At this point, it is not clear whether this decrease is due 
to the screening or because of other factors.  Id.
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state actually makes the victim safer.
273
  In addition, while serious 
emotional harm is also an integral part of an abusive relationship, this 
type of harm alone would probably be difficult for the state to 
measure in a particular relationship given the fact that many 
relationships involve partners being emotionally unkind to one 
another.  For that reason, while emotional abuse should be considered 
in the overall assessment of the danger of a particular relationship, 
state intervention should probably be limited to those relationships 
that actually involve physical violence.  Furthermore, assessing the 
risk of harm to children in a violent home should involve more than 
merely determining that they have seen the violence.
274
   
 Finally, in the event that the state does decide to intervene in 
a particular case, no victim should be required to cooperate with the 
criminal justice system as a witness should the state choose to pursue 
charges against her batterer.  Some may argue that the only way to 
ensure a conviction against dangerous offenders is with the 
cooperation of the victim, but the truth of the matter is that the idea 
of compelled cooperation is self-contradictory—if a victim truly does 
not want to cooperate with the authorities, she will often end up 
recanting or refusing to show up to the proceedings.
 275
  Contempt or 
perjury charges might remedy this problem, but if we truly appreciate 
these victims’ privacy, it seems repugnant to incarcerate victims 
when they act so as to protect their families.
276
   
 
 
C. A Grassroots Approach 
 
 Because of the particularly public and stigmatizing nature of 
the criminal justice system or because of other personal reasons, a 
grassroots approach similar to the early battered women’s movement 
will be more appealing to some victims.  Indeed, some victims 
manage to stop violence in their lives without the criminal justice 
                                                 
273 See supra note ____. 
274 See infra Part ____. 
275 See supra Part ____.   
276
 See Goodmark, supra note _____, at 32-33 (describing the experience of Noellee Mowatt 
who was jailed for a week without bail until she agreed to testify against her batter);  State v. 
Finney, 591 S.E.2d 863, 865 (2004) (describing how Virginia Finney was threatened with 
arrest if she did not cooperate with the prosecution of her husband’s first-degree rape case).  
See also  Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning a Blind Eye:  Perjury in Domestic Violence Cases, 
39 N.M. L. REV. 149 (2009) (arguing for a balanced approach in determining when domestic 
violence victims should be prosecuted for perjury given the complexity of their situations). 




  They do this by finding a support system through friends 
and family and creating a safety plan.
278
   
There have already been some efforts in creating this type of 
grassroots approach.  In Chicago, SHALVA is an independent 
agency that specifically focuses on the needs of the Jewish 
community.
279
  Sensitive to the specific needs of women of the 
Jewish faith, they provide a 24-hour crisis hotline and support 
services for Jewish domestic violence victims.
280
  They also provide 
educational and prevention programs for the Jewish community, and 
they educate rabbis, police, hospital social workers, teachers, camp 
counselors and friends and families about domestic abuse.
281
  
Similarly, Trinity United Church of Christ , also in Chicago, has an 
outreach program that educates members of the church and the 
community about domestic violence and its effect on the family, and 
it provides confidential referral, emergency shelter, and counseling 
services to domestic violence victims.
282
  On a more secular level, 
“CUT IT OUT” is a national program that trains hair stylists on the 
signs of domestic abuse and encourages them to provide their clients 
with information about support agencies in their area.
283
  While a 
strong criminal justice response to domestic violence is extremely 
important--especially for cases involving chronic, serious abuse,
284
-- 
grassroots programs are also necessary for those women who will 
never engage with the criminal justice system. 
There is still a legitimate concern that these grassroots 
programs might become as intrusive in women’s lives as the criminal 
justice system, especially if they are funded by the state.  This is 
always the dilemma that seems to occur; once the state provides 
support to an individual, it is believed to be justifiable for the state to 
infringe on the individual’s privacy.
285
  It is certainly the case that as 
battered women’s shelters received more governmental funding, they 
                                                 
277 LEE H. BOWKER, BEATING WIFE-BEATING 124-25 (1983) (citing the examples of Sharon, 
who was able to end her religious husband’s violence through religious arguments, and 
Karen, whose daughter convinced Karen’s husband to attend Alcoholic’s Anonymous, 
which ultimately led him to stop abusing his wife); Coker, supra note ____ at 826.  
278
BOWKER, supra note ______ at 75-80;  BUZAWA, supra note ____, at 201; Mahoney, supra 
note _____ at 73. 
279 See http://www.shalvaonline.org. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. 
282 See http://www.trinity chicago.org. 
283 See http:/www.cutitout.org. 
284 Eve. S. Buzawa & Aaron D. Buzawa, Courting Domestic Violence Victims:  A Tale of 
Two Cities, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 671, 681-82 (2008) (citing research that suggests 
that prolonged incarceration may be the only way to protect victims from chronic, repeat 
offenders). 
285 See supra Part _____. 
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became more “professionalized” and moved away from the 
nonheirarchal grassroots feel of the early battered women’s 
movement.
286
  As already discussed, however, the interconnectedness 
of the public and private spheres justifies the right that victims have 
to both affirmative support and privacy from the state.
287




Participants in the women’s liberation and battered women’s 
movements worked very hard to change the legal view that domestic 
violence is a private matter.  This activism led to important changes 
in the criminal justice system’s treatment of domestic violence and to 
the creation of shelters and other support programs for domestic 
violence victims.  Yet there are still victims who do not want to share 
their abuse with the criminal justice system because they view their 
violence as private.  This attitude probably stems from the fact that 
limiting the amount of state intrusion into the intimate details of 
one’s life necessarily increases one’s decisional privacy, which is 
highly valued not only by many domestic violence victims, but by 
Americans in general.
288
  Privacy is a complex concept that can be 
harmful to victims in some contexts, but it can also be beneficial to 
them by giving victims more of a voice about which solutions are 
appropriate for their particular situation.  Indeed, more privacy would 
protect the personhood of domestic violence victims and limit the 
threat of an abusive state.  For these reasons, it is worth examining 
the benefits of a privacy right that not only entitles victims to state 
protection from violence but that also entitles victims to not engage 
with the criminal justice system should that be their choice.  
Furthermore, grassroot approaches outside of the criminal justice 
system are necessary in order to provide assistance to those women 
who choose to exercise this choice. 
Victims’ hesitancy to engage with the criminal justice system 
may mean that this system just needs to be implemented in better 
ways, such as improving the responsiveness of state actors to victims 
or creating better access to material support.  This hesitancy also 
probably means, however, that a criminal justice solution is simply 
not the best choice for all victims. 
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